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Abstract
John Stuart Mill's utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, often surfaces in
cultural debates in the contemporary West over the extent and foundations of moral duties. Given the drift
from its historical Judeo-Christian moorings, naturalism now provides much of the epistemic grounding in
Western culture in relation to moral duties. The amalgamation of Mill’s utilitarianism and naturalism has
resulted in a cultural and epistemic disconnect. Naturalism is hard-pressed to provide consistent
epistemic support for Mill’s utilitarian principle. This essay provides a number of suggestions as to why
Mill’s utilitarianism may be inconsistent on naturalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Among various ethical theories, naturalism would seem to find close fit with
utilitarianism, yet it fails to provide a substantive argument for the utilitarian
principle via lack of moral explanatory power. In a sentence, utilitarianism selfdestructs on naturalism. In order to argue for this proposal, I shall attempt to do
the following. First, I shall provide a working definition for both utilitarianism and
naturalism. In order to sharpen the focus, I will specifically address the version of
utilitarianism espoused by John Stuart Mill. Second, I shall endeavor to
demonstrate the incompatibility of utilitarianism and naturalism because of three
naturalistic options that result in anemic explanatory power: 1) the vacuity of the
utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number on
naturalism, 2) the lack of moral explanatory power of naturalism on raw
naturalistic, evolutionary survivalism, and 3) the self-contradiction of Sam Harris’
concept of “creaturely flourishing” on naturalism. Third, I shall explicate the
inadequacy of naturalism to account for moral duties in three specific ways: 1) the
moral vacuity of higher and lower pleasures, 2) the lack of moral explanatory power
of the moral duties to contribute to human happiness, and 3) the lack of explanatory
power of moral duties and free will. For the purposes of this paper, I shall adopt the
definition that naturalism is a denial of the supernatural.
Before diving into the philosophical deep end, one suggestion to consider,
even if only for a moment, is the grim consequences of mistakenly assuming
naturalism.1 Imagine the inexpressible tidal wave of grief that has overcome more
than a miniscule sampling of former naturalists when they came to the shocking
realization that their conclusions were wrong only to find comfort in a newfound
relationship with God. C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkein, Lew Wallace, Alister McGrath,
and Francis Collins are just a few of the intellectual bulwarks that dot the
landscape of those who have departed ways with naturalism. While the existence of
God is not the primary focus of this paper, the reader would do well to keep in mind
the supremacy that philosophical presuppositions play in ethical queries.2

On this point, Blaise Pascal writes, “the immorality of the soul is something of such vital
importance to us, affecting us so deeply, that one must have lost all feeling not to care about knowing
the facts of the matter. All our actions and thoughts must follow such different paths, according to
whether there is hope of eternal blessings or not, that the only possible way of acting with sense and
judgment is to decide our course of action in light of this point, which ought to be our ultimate
objective.” Blaise Pascal, Pensees, trans. Honor Levi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 143. In,
David Baggett & Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 179.
2 For a fascinating read on an evidential critique of naturalism and the afterlife, see, Gary
Habermas & J.P. Moreland, Immorality: The Other Side of Death (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1995).
1
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DEFINITION BEFORE DISCOURSE: UTILITARIANISM AND NATURALISM
Utilitarianism, as expressed by its erudite proponent, John Stuart Mill, is
“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By
happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and
the privation of pleasure.”3 I have selected Mill because he is arguably one of the
most polished proponents of utilitarianism. His clarification of Epicurus’ excesses
and avoidance of Bentham’s unwieldy hedonic calculus makes for a highly
respectable platform.
In a spirit of honest scholarship, Mill admits what many ethicists are slow to
confess that no ethical theory is without tension. He wisely notes, “There exists no
moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting
obligation.”4 Beginning with Epicurus’ hedonism, to Bentham’s hedonic calculus,
followed by Mills’ explication of “customary morality,”5 utilitarianism has played a
major part in the progress of Western philosophy.
INCOMPATIBILITY OF UTILITARIANISM AND NATURALISM
1) Odd Bedfellows: Cultural Equality on Naturalistic Utilitarianism
One of the greatest challenges for naturalistic utilitarianism is quantifying
the moral foundations of equality. Western culture almost a priori alludes to the
often referenced but rarely defined idea of equality in ethical debates. Such moral
musings come to full bloom in the relentless cultural debate about the role of the
government in society. Far beyond Adam Smith’s classical liberalism—limiting the
government’s three-fold role to protecting society from invasion, providing a level
economic playing field, and maintaining public works6—is the increasing belief that
the government should take on a larger role in society. While progressives routinely
adopt a Kantian textbook narrative in championing the showcase progressive
values of abortion, rights of workers to unionize, or providing LGBT persons the
legal right to marry whomever they wish, there is still a utilitarian undercurrent.
The narrative on alleged inalienable rights is often immediately followed with a
conjecturing, “Imagine what society would be like if these rights were infringed,”
form of argumentation that begins Kantian and ends textbook utilitarian.

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 55.
Ibid., 71.
5 Ibid., 51.
6 Adam Smith, On the Wealth of Nations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869), 350. Smith notes
the common governmental disregard for fiscal responsibility; “Kings are always the greatest
spendthrifts in society.” Ibid., 585.
3
4
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On the other hand, conservatives routinely champion the individual rights of
private property, private firearms ownership,7 rights of the unborn, and religious
liberty by appealing to the model of limited government. For example, the first line
of argumentation for the conservative position on private firearms ownership is
laced with references to individual liberty. However, usually upon facing strong
interrogation on how the expression of those alleged rights could result in societal
harm, the conservative argument shifts to the uncomfortable prospect of a society
where only criminals and the government have access to firearms.8 What begins
Kantian, when pressed, ends with an appeal to utility. On the other hand, the
progressive argument for the restriction of private firearms ownership appeals to
equality by way of creating a safer society.
Although they both appeal to individual liberties, progressives more often
place building a safer society ahead of certain individual liberties whereas
conservatives also appeal to what would produce the ideal society. Behind both of
these respective positions is the driving principle of equality in that both positions
argue for societal principles that would produce the maximum pleasure for the
maximum number. At their core, camouflaged utilitarian equality links popular
conservatism and progressivism. Mill argues precisely this point where he argues
that the vague standard referenced by ethicists throughout philosophical history “is
the utilitarian one.”9 Mill goes so far as to suggest that the essentials of Kant’s
universal maxim are actually utilitarian.10 It is precisely this point as it relates to
naturalism that I seek to highlight.
Paul M. Barrett, “ “Gun Control and the Constitution: Should We Amend the Second
Amendment?” Bloomberg Business Week, February 20, 2014.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-20/gun-control-and-the-constitution-should-weamend-the-second-amendment-. Barrett exegetes Justice John Paul Stevens’ argument that the
Second Amendment only applies to those serving in military roles and thus, private firearms
ownership should be banned.
8 Despite claiming to argue from a standpoint of individual liberty, Wayne LaPierre,
Executive Vice President of the National Rifle Association, dedicates an entire chapter to the
utilitarian-leaning argument of what would happen if private firearms ownership were banned. See,
chapter 11, “Arming Against Crime,” by Wayne LaPierre, Guns, Crime, and Freedom (Washington,
D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1994).
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 51-52. Mill attempts arguing this point by wedging an undercutter deep within
deontological territory where he later writes, “When Kant (as before remarked) propounds as the
fundamental principle of morals, ‘So act, that thy rule of conduct might be adopted as a law by all
rational beings,’ he virtually acknowledges that the interest of all mankind collectively, or at least of
mankind indiscriminately, must be in the mind of the agent when conscientiously deciding on the
morality of the act. Otherwise he uses words without a meaning: for, that a rule even of utter
selfishness could not possibly be adopted by all rational beings—that there is any insuperable
obstacle in the nature of all things to its adoption—cannot be even plausibly maintained. To give any
meaning to Kant’s principle, the sense put upon it must be, that we ought to shape our conduct by a
rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective interest” (97).
7
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Yet a most intriguing query is how utilitarianism relates to the foundation of
equality. For the conservative, what is the foundation for the inalienable rights of
all persons? For the progressive, what is the moral warrant for the duty to produce
a society grounded on equality? For the theist, the answer comes much easier than
for the naturalist. In the words of Thomas Jefferson enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence, inalienable rights come from the Creator. Therefore, individual
rights and safeguards against governmental infringement on these rights find
considerable warrant on theism. Human equality makes considerable sense on
theism, especially Christian theism, because God has created all persons in His
image signifying intrinsic value.11 For naturalists, however, the situation becomes
much more challenging. First, if God does not exist, then rights most likely come
from culture or oneself rather than a transcendent authority. As I will argue, none
of the naturalistic options provide a satisfactory source of intrinsic human rights
upon which equality makes sense. Second, the entire premise of Mill’s
utilitarianism is inextricably intertwined with the concept of equality, an
abstraction that is extremely difficult to establish on naturalism.
For instance, equality of the shared human experience, the clearest possible
illustration of the distribution of the greatest amount of happiness to the greatest
number of persons, assumes a necessary moral grounding that naturalists seem
hard-pressed to answer. Chronological conditioning is a pivotal historical
consideration in providing an adequate treatment of naturalism and utilitarianism.
Alasdair MacIntyre chronicles a cultural contrast between the heroic age and
contemporary Western culture as follows:
The self of the heroic age lack precisely that characteristic which we have
already seen that some modern moral philosophers take to be an essential
characteristic of human selfhood: the capacity to detach oneself from any particular
standpoint or point of view from the outside. In heroic society, there is no “outside”
except that of the stranger. A man who tried to withdraw himself from his given
position in heroic society would be engaged in the enterprise of trying to make
himself disappear.12
MacIntyre’s observation reveals how the communal nature of most
traditional cultures clashes with the sort of individualism prominent in
contemporary Western culture. Either way, neither the value of community in
ancient heroic culture nor the moral merit placed on individualism of the
contemporary West13 finds necessary grounding for human equality on naturalistic
Genesis 1:26-27.
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
2008), 126.
13 Although a popular-level article, the observation of Paul Piff, assistant professor of
psychology and social behavior at the University of California, Irvine, and Dacher Keltner, professor
of psychology at the University of California, Berkeley, is illustrative on this point where they note
the, “broad societal shift that has been widely observed over the past 50 years: People have become
11
12
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utilitarianism. Yet, combined with an increasing secularism, naturalistic
utilitarianism has already seeped into much of popular culture and very well could
become the preferred social ethical option for the majority of contemporary
Westerners.14 Fashioned into the mold of individualism supplemented by a steady
diet of consumerism, the average Westerner is well versed with the promises and
disappointments of personal and collective utilitarianism.15 As Brad S. Gregory
laments, “The new and more deadly threat was that of cultural assimilation and
prosperity: “[G]oods are multiplied, but the soul is impoverished; clothes have
become expensive, but interior beauty is gone.”16
Interestingly, the idea of virtue in heroic societies has much to do with utility,
which is precisely Mill’s argument contra Kant.17 In order to correct a prevalent
false impression of utilitarianism, Mill argues for a reassessment all the way back
to its earliest hedonistic roots. As to the contra mantra, “Epicureanism is a
philosophy for pigs,” Mill counsels, “Epicureans have always answered, that it is not
they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since
the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of
which swine are capable.”18 Rather, Mill argues, “The happiness which they meant
was not a life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and
transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the
active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect
more from life than it is capable of bestowing.”19 For this reason, Mill establishes an
ethical criterion wherein the moral scales of circumstantial happiness should
promote pleasure and prevent pain. Since utilitarianism has a strongly practical
element, the question of how to produce pleasure instead of pain becomes quickly
more individualistic, more self-focused, more materialistic and less connected to others.” Paul Piff
and Dacher Keltner, “Why Do We Experience Awe?” The New York Times, May 22, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/opinion/sunday/why-do-we-experience-awe.html?_r=0.
14 The disappearance of the self could be a referent of absurdity in the contemporary West for
two reasons. First, life is largely viewed through the lenses of personal gratification via a radically
individualistic operating principle of the pursuit of happiness. Second, the rise of divorce and the
subsequent fracturing of the family have contributed to a colossal fracturing of cultural identity as
well as the most basic familial structures upon which persons find their most basic identity.
15 The rise and fall of utopian attempts, from the commune of Brook Farms to the Soviet
behemoth, is richly documented but often poorly understood. Moreover, whenever utilitarianism has
been wedded to atheistic governments, one should expect an exponential increase in atrocities if
history is any guide.
16 Brad S. Gregory, Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 244. In, Kevin Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine:
A Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian Doctrine (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2005), 432.
17 MacIntyre, 122. MacIntyre makes this clear in his intricate word study of arête.
18 Mill, 55.
19 Ibid., 60.
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mired in the quagmire of difficult ethical options.20 The Emmy award winning
series, Breaking Bad, provides a textbook example of utilitarian reasoning in
Walter White’s agonizing decision on whether or not to kill a particular drug
dealer.21 Moreover, the utilitarian principle is notoriously difficult to quantify given
limited human epistemic access.22
As will be explained further in this paper, Mill’s conception of pleasure is not
so paltry so as to only include physical well being. However, on naturalism, “higher
pleasures” are still, by definition, physical. Whether swine or scholars, corporeal or
cognitive, pleasure and pain are ultimately quantifiable only in material terms.
Therefore, Mill’s distinction between the pleasures of swine and persons fails on
naturalism for two reasons. First, if God exists, then an argument can be made for a
noncorporeal reality, often called the soul or spirit that would exemplify the
possibility of noncorporeal higher pleasures. Since God’s existence is rejected a
priori on naturalism, the existence of the soul, and thus, noncorporeal reality, is
also repudiated since it is not a physical reality. Second, on naturalism, even if one
argues for a robust and extensive cognitive superiority of humans over animals, the
issue is still one of molecular change, not moral responsibility. Michael Peterson
writes, “Alternative conceptual systems, such as naturalism or pantheism, can
explain neither our peculiar consciousness of value nor its senseless destruction.”23
Interestingly, William James dedicates his work, Pragmatism, to Mill, “To the Memory of
John Stuart Mill, from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy
likes to picture as our leader were he alive today.” See, William James, Pragmatism (New York:
Dover Publications, 1995), foreword.
21 Jonah Goldberg astutely summarizes, “Walter agonizes over what to do with him. Still the
man of reason, he sits down with a notepad and writes up a list of pros and cons. Among the items on
the list: “Con: MURDER IS WRONG! Pro: He’ll kill your entire family if you let him go.” Walter
ultimately kills Krazy 8, but under circumstances that he can justify as self-defense. Over time,
though, Walter’s definition of self-defense grows beyond any moral justification, and his reluctance to
kill shrinks to almost nothing. Once you step outside the borders of morality and the law, selfinterest becomes self-justifying. Indeed, this is how pragmatism unchained from moral principles
simply becomes a Nietzschean will to power. In a very different context, the philosopher Bertrand
Russell realized this long ago. When nations shed moral principles and put their stake solely in
power and pragmatism, Russell wrote in 1909, “ironclads and Maxim guns must be the ultimate
arbiters of metaphysical truth.” Jonah Goldberg, “Breaking Bad Breaks Through,” National Review
Online, (New York City, NY), September 23, 2013.
http://m.nationalreview.com/article/359223/breaking-bad-breaks-through-jonahgoldberg/page/0/2?utm_source=web&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=091213
22 One example comes from the pioneering work of Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard on the
development of the atom bomb. Szilard’s initial letter to Roosevelt in 1939 outlined the terrifying
prospect of nuclear fission. As the bomb’s development progressed Szilard’s internal campaign
against deployment of the new weapon on Japanese civilian targets increased. For a fascinating
account of moral realism in the context of inexorable technological increase, see, Kai Bird and Martin
J. Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York:
Vintage Books, 2006), 422.
23 Michael Peterson, Evil and the Christian God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1982), 65.
20
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Making sense of consciousness on naturalism presents no small number of
challenges.24 Either way, sowing Mill’s utilitarian seeds on naturalistic soil results
in an uncomfortable absence of moral interpretive power.
2) Naturalism and Naturalistic Evolutionary Survivalism
While evolution does not necessitate naturalism, it best fits the naturalistic
paradigm for explanatory power of life’s origins simply because it is the only game
in town.25 How can Mill’s utilitarian telos of pleasure over pain survive in the telosdeprived landscape of naturalistic evolution’s unguided process?26 The best
naturalistic evolution has to offer is a raw sort of base survivalism. This is often
expressed as “natural selection,” which is an unduly articulate title for a theory that
is functionally the law of the jungle.27 Survival and the propagation of the species
becomes the mantra of naturalistic social Darwinism. Humanitarian aid, an almost
universally accepted virtue in the West, becomes fundamentally counterproductive
where the strong deplete themselves in order to sustain the weak in their time of
need. Such humanitarianism is consistent with the Mill’s utilitarian principle so
long as there is an intrinsic equality and value attributed to human life. However,
when God is removed from the equation, this benevolent anthropological link is
severely hampered if not altogether severed. A glimpse into the merciless landscape
of naturalistic evolution guts the impetus to strive for the greatest happiness for the
greatest number. Utilitarianism’s prescriptive emphasis finds itself at odds with a
morally bereft ergo on the few, the lucky, the survivors.
In order to counteract this rather bleak picture, certain ontologically creative
naturalists have attempted to craft an alternative telos. What I am arguing here is
that many naturalists attempt to function on utilitarian ideals which are vacuous
on naturalism. For example, the famous British atheist Bertrand Russell bleakly
reflects, “There is darkness without, and when I die there will be darkness within.
There is no splendour, no vastness anywhere; only triviality for a moment, and then
nothing. Why live in such a world? Why even die?”28 Yet Russell goes on to give an
encomium to facing the ultimate absurdity of life with bravery grounded in “the
On consciousness, Keith Ward writes, “At the level of human consciousness one has to
introduce the concepts of information-theory to understand what is going on…The topic of
consciousness is one of the greatest mysteries of human thought.“ Religion & Human
Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 140, 147.
25 Alister McGrath and Francis Collins are notable examples of theistic evolutionists.
26 Theistic evolutionists object to an overgeneralization of evolution as an unguided process
simply because argue that God guides the process of evolution. Hence, I have chosen to specifically
address the unguided and morally vacuous evolutionary naturalism rather than a general
Darwinism because of the possible theistic evolution alternative.
27 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species or the Preservation of the Favored Races in the
Struggle for Life (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2001), 63.
28 Bertrand Russell, Autobiography (New York: Routledge, 1975, 2010), 374.
24
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firm foundation of unyielding despair.”29 This is little short of a wholesale
capitulation to nihilism, yet Russell still attempts to establish some sort of
happiness-producing modus operandi. Russellian bravery looks like a strategy of
philosophical self-medication and a thoroughly utilitarian one at that. Even if it
serves as an existential solace in an otherwise absurd universe, the placebo effect is
still utilitarian in nature because it serves to provide persons with the happiness of
purpose in place of the pain of despair.
Not to be outdone, Richard Dawkins flatly states, “In a universe of blind
physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other
people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any
justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if
there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind
pitiless indifference.”30 Yet, in his popularized documentary, The Root of All Evil,
Dawkins argues that the sheer improbability of sentient life is sufficient to establish
objective purpose. What is this purpose? Simply enjoying the brevity of life.31
My point here is that these examples carry a common element: arbitrariness.
Whether mind or muscle, philosophical or physical, emotional or educational, these
attempts to establish meaning are utilitarian. The Achilles heel of this naturalistic
idealism is in the paucity of transcendent grounding. Once the philosophical
verbiage and emotional catch phrases are removed, one is left with raw, naturalistic,
evolutionary survivalism. On such a view, why advocate a moral duty to one’s own
happiness or that of society?
L. Rush Bush raises a point vehemently contested by most contemporary
Darwinists, where he writes, “The Nazi movement in Germany was one of the
logical conclusions of these ideas. For some people racism was scientifically justified
on evolutionary biological grounds.”32 Still yet, for some evolutionary naturalists,
speciation, not to be confused with human happiness, is the zenith of existence.33 In
fact, there is a contingent of evolutionary naturalists who believe a massive

Bertrand Russell, “A Free Man’s Worship,” in Why I Am Not a Christian, ed. P. Edwards
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957), 107. In, William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian
Truth and Apologetics, 3rd ed. (Wheaton: Crossway, 2008), 50.
30 Richard Dawkins, River out of Eden (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 133.
31 The Root of All Evil, directed by Richard Dawkins. (2006; London, United Kingdom: A
Channel 4 documentary, 2006).
32 Bush, 31.
33 Peter Singer argues, “Surely there will be some nonhuman animals whose lives, by any
standards, are more valuable than the lives of some humans.” Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A
New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 19. Singer also
states, “Human babies are not born self-aware, or capable of grasping that they exist over time. They
are not persons; therefore, “the life of a newborn is of less value than the life of a pig, a dog, or a
chimpanzee.” Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),
122-123.
29
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Malthusian34 decrease in human population is the remedy for humanity’s woes.35
Humans are understood as the nemesis of the planet and, if allowed to freely
procreate, will spell out almost certain destruction.36 Yet, on naturalism, where does
one acquire the ethical materials to construct a moral argument against such
postulates? Even esteemed scholar Sir David Attenborough has joined the ranks of
the anti-human movement with his stark confession:
We are a plague on the Earth. It’s coming home to roost over the next 50
years or so. It’s not just climate change; it’s sheer space, places to grow food for this
enormous horde. Either we limit our population growth or the natural world will do
it for us, and the natural world is doing it for us right now…We keep putting on
programs about famine in Ethiopia; that’s what’s happening. Too many people there.
They can’t support themselves—and it’s not an inhuman thing to say. It’s the
case.37
On such a view, not only is humanitarian aid to be withheld, such assistance
is a roadblock to evolutionary progress. How can one maintain Mill’s universal
utilitarian principle on such naturalism bereft of human equality and the most
basic instincts of pity? One helpful aspect is to remember that logic does not exist in
an ethical vacuum. Ethics inform logic. William Lane Craig’s treatise on the

This sort of anti-human thinking finds much of its philosophical roots in the work of
British cleric, Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) who unashamedly advocated, “[Persons] should consider
the general welfare of the human race, of the society in which they lived, and of their own families,
and so not cumber the earth with useless and miserable people.” Hence, the phrase, “useless eaters”
stems from Malthus’ fear that overpopulation would destroy the human race. Patricia James,
Population Malthus: His life and times (Abingdon: Routledge, 1979), 61.
35 Peter Huber, paraphrases, “Pentti Linkola, an amateur biologist, eco-fascist, and one of
Finland’s most celebrated authors…the West must end all aid to refugees and the Third World.
Abortion should be mandatory for women who have already borne two children. We occupy a sinking
ship with one hundred passengers, and a lifeboat for only ten. “Those who hate life try to pull more
people on board and drown everybody. Those who love and respect life use axes to chop off the extra
hands hanging on the gunwale.”” Such policies presuppose the false environmental and economic
concept of a zero-sum game. Peter Huber, Hard Green: Saving the Environment from the
Environmentalists-A Conservative Manifesto (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 160.
36 Malthus’ thoughts are best popularized by Paul R. Ehrlich’s 1968 bestseller: The
Population Bomb. Ehrlich’s ominous foreword reads, “The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In
the 1970s and 1980s hundreds of millions of people will starve to death in spite of any crash
programs embarked upon now.” The fear of overpopulation, and its alleged contribution to pollution
and ravaging of natural resources remain a driving thought within much of current
environmentalism although Ehrlich’s ominous prophecies have systematically been proven false.
Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Ballatine Books, 1968), xi.
37 Sir David Attenborough, interview by Louise Gray, “Humans are Plague on Earth,” The
Telegraph (London, UK), Jan. 22, 2013.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/9815862/Humans-are-plague-on-EarthAttenborough.html
34
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absurdity of life without God empties the naturalist’s reservoir of purpose.38 Craig’s
contention is that ultimately life is absurd without God. Even if the naturalist
attempts to retain some trace of existential teleology, the point still remains:
worldview sets the logical plumb line, not the reverse. Attenborough’s commentary,
though seemingly heartless, is thoroughly consistent on naturalism. Wedding
utilitarianism and naturalism produces a strained coalition.
On the other hand, theism, particularly Christian theism, advocates a radical
sort of self-denial that flies in the face of evolutionary naturalism. Kierkegaard
somberly pleas, “But even if it is very pleasant for flesh and blood to avoid
opposition, I wonder if it is a comfort also in the hour of death. In the hour of death,
surely the only comfort is that one has not avoided opposition but has suffered it.”39
Evolutionary naturalism has no such category even on Mill’s utilitarianism.
Robert Merrihew Adams’ critique of moral shock, a concept very onerous to
establish on naturalism, provides far more explanatory power than a naturalistic
formulation of herd mentality or any other such musings. Reverence for the imago
dei, by way of not violating the sanctity of personhood, is the best method of
minimizing pain and maximizing pleasure. History bears testimony to the fact that
a culture’s respect for the intrinsic value of human life has a direct correlation to
the well being of persons in that respective culture. Adams writes, “I think the
moral horror or abomination there (Nazis making lampshades out of human skin) is
not to be found in the blurring of a socially recognized boundary but in what is done
to images of God.”40 A respect for inalienable rights creates the potential for a free
and virtuous society while simultaneously restraining vice. Naturalism erodes
transcendent ethics and creates an ethical vacuum almost always filled with human
tragedy on a grandiose scale. Ideas have implications and ethical theories never
remain only on the reservation of academia.41 They take on a life of their own as
they trickle down into popular culture and politics. Marx’s dialectical materialism
exacerbated already nightmarish human suffering from the borders of Eastern
Europe to the frigid shores of North Korea. On the other hand, the ideals of
Bonhoeffer’s radical Christian ethics and Wilberforce’s social compassion for both
humans and animals, rooted in the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, still attract the
youthful zeal of young Christ-followers to give their finest years in the stench of
fetid slums and Third World orphanages.
3) Naturalism and Creaturely Flourishing
William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 65-88.
Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, eds. and trans.
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1995), 84.
40 Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 126.
41 See, R.C. Sproul, The Consequences of Ideas: Understanding the Concepts that Shaped our
World (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2009).
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Sam Harris attempts a more suit and tie approach to morality on naturalism.
It should be noted that Harris does not claim utilitarianism. However, as I will
show, his proposal of creaturely flourishing constitutes the core of utilitarian ideals
even if they go unnamed. Harris writes, “I will argue, however, that questions about
values—about meaning, morality, and life’s larger purpose—are really questions
about the well-being of conscious creatures.”42 Harris’ thesis is a colossal yet
unsuccessful attempt to amalgamate utilitarianism and naturalism. Unfortunately
for Harris, the epic failure of his theory was broadcast to an embarrassing level in
his debate with William Lane Craig. Craig’s rebuttal notes the difficulty of Harris’
position:
But Dr. Harris has to defend an even more radical claim than that: he claims
that the property of being good is identical with the property of creaturely
flourishing. And he’s not offered any defense of this radical identity claim. In
fact, I think we have a knock-down argument against it…On the next-to-last
page of his book, Dr. Harris makes the telling admission that if people like
rapists, liars, and thieves could be just as happy as good people, then his
“moral landscape” would no longer be a moral landscape. Rather, it would
just be a continuum of well-being whose peaks are occupied by good and bad
people, or evil people, alike.43
Such an admission reveals not only the sandy foundation of Harris’ moral landscape
but also an unintentional backdoor endorsement of psychopathy. Who can deny the
possibility that the psychopath can actually flourish so long as the psychopath
avoids punishment? It seems that outside of employing a transcendent flourishing,
Harris’ moral landscape seems just as relevant to psychopaths as to philanthropists.
Craig goes on to reference philosopher of science Michael Ruse:
The position of the modern evolutionist…is that humans have an awareness
of morality…because such an awareness is of biological worth. Morality is a
biological adaptation no less than are hands and feet and teeth…Considered
as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is
illusory. I appreciate that when somebody says “Love thy neighbor as
thyself,” they think they are referring above and beyond
themselves…Nevertheless…such reference is truly without foundation.
Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction…and any deeper
Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New
York: Free Press, 2010), 1.
43 Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New
York: Free Press, 2010), 190. Sam Harris and William Lane Craig, “Is the Foundation of Morality
Natural or Supernatural?” Debate, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, April 2011,
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-the-foundation-of-morality-natural-or-supernaturalthe-craigharris#ixzz2WDNGm1tT
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meaning is illusory.44
While Harris grasps for materials within the storehouse of naturalism to construct
his moral landscape he comes up woefully short. Naturalism simply fails the stress
test to support Harris’ morally weighty moral landscape. Craig’s stinging rebuttal
on this point stands as a textbook example of a rare knock down argument in
serious academic discourse.
INADEQUACY OF NATURALISM TO ACCOUNT FOR MORAL DUTIES
1) Moral Vacuity of Higher and Lower Pleasures
Mill traces a line of demarcation between various levels of pleasure. He
writes:
If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what
makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except
it’s being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two
pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of
both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation
to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.45
For Mill, the answer to the degradation of morals in society was mental cultivation,
not much unlike Plato’s educational maxim, although with a specific bent toward
the cognitive. Adams writes, “The effect of Mill’s use of it (the higher/lower
pleasures distinction) is to stack the deck against the sensualist and in favor of
intellectual, social, and moral pleasures.”46 Mill’s point here provides a substantive

Michael Ruse, “Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics,” in The Darwinian Paradigm
(London: Routledge, 1989), 262, 268-9. In, “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?”
Debate between William Lane Craig and Sam Harris, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, April
2011. http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-the-foundation-of-morality-natural-or-supernatural-thecraig-harris#ixzz2WDRC9fGo. Craig then references Darwin’s admission, “If we were to rewind the
film of human evolution and start anew, people with a very different set of moral values might well
have evolved. As Darwin himself wrote in The Descent of Man, “If men were reared under precisely
the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like
the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their
fertile daughters, and no one would think of interfering.” For us to think that human beings are
special and our morality is objectively true is to succumb to the temptation to species-ism, that is to
say an unjustified bias in favor of one’s own species.” Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and
Selection in Relation to Sex, 2nd edition (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1909), 100. In, “Is the
Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?” Debate between William Lane Craig and Sam
Harris, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, April 2011. http://www.reasonablefaith.org/isthefoundation-of-morality-natural-or-supernatural-the-craig-harris#ixzz2WDSXlUHW
45 Mill, 56.
46 Adams, 91.
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rebuttal against those who seek to lump enlightened utilitarians together with
licentious hedonists.
However, the question for this discussion is whether or not Mill’s
higher/lower pleasures demarcation persists on naturalism. The smoke and mirrors
game appears to quickly collapse under a most basic investigation. Mental and
physical pleasures are, at their core, still physical processes. Why could one not take
Callicles’ admonition in Plato’s Gorgias, “a man who is going to lead a full life must
allow his desires to become as mighty as may be and never repress them”?47 This
begs the question on whether our desires are inherently drawn toward the rational
or to selfishness, even if it entails a certain level of irrationalism. Then again, do
such moral terms have the license to enter naturalistic territory? Virtually all of the
discussion on higher and lower order goods presupposes moral realism that is
qualitatively non-physical by definition. Take, for example, Adams’ designation of
Mill’s pleasure categories:
Here we must ask how those who have fallen have lost their capacity for the
higher pleasures. Is this really a change that could have preceded the change
in their preferences? I think not. The only way in which people can possibly
be said to have lost their capacity for moral or social pleasures in such cases
is by ceasing to care very much about other people and about morality. Mill’s
deck is stacked against the sensory pleasures precisely because we are all
susceptible to them.48
Even the language of virtue and vice carries heavy moralistic overtones. As has
been stated, on naturalism, in the end, everything is simply matter no matter how
one may sift it. Adams goes on to note that naturalistic utilitarianism fails to even
account for the value of human relationships.49 If anything, naturalism can, at the
very best, contribute to what nurses survival. However, mere propagation of the
human race, given the apparent human potential for greater planes of existence, is
a depressingly low bar.50
If there is no qualitative or moral distinction between higher and lower level
pleasures, then morality evaporates from the courtroom and slips into a test tube of
bleak physical formulas. MacIntyre notes Nietzsche’s reaction to the death of God,
John E. Hare, God and Morality: A Philosophical History (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons,
2009), 275-276.
48 Adams, 92.
49 He writes, “In some areas of human life, however, and particularly were certain kinds of
personal relationships are concerned, the economic model is grossly inadequate for an understanding
of what is involved in being good to people.” Ibid., 142.
50 For those who consider these claims too strong, see Alasdair MacIntyre’s spirited,
Intractable Disputes, edited by Lawrence S. Cunningham (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2009).
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the unspoken core of the rise of naturalism, “But Nietzsche then goes on to confront
the problem that this act of destruction has created. The underlying structure of his
argument is as follows: if there is nothing to morality today but expressions of will,
my morality can only be what my will creates. There can be no place for such
fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest happiness of the greatest number.”51
Even Mill’s own recognition of human frailty makes little sense on
naturalism. Mill laments the “many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for
everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness.”52
What is noble? What makes nobility a virtue and indolence and selfishness a vice?
Mill’s theology is a non-issue per the point of this paper even though his warning of
the downward pull of the lower nature is nonsensical on naturalism. In fact, Mill’s
warning of the attraction of the lower nature to lower-end pleasures makes the most
sense on the Christian view of human nature.53
If one appreciates a certain sort of academic acrobatics, one needs look no
further than to observe a utilitarian naturalist try to make sense of Mill’s words
toward religion. Mill writes, “If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things,
the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation,
utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any
other.”54 For Mill, the category of pleasure is defined best not in terms of corporeal
pain and punishment but rather may include religious devotion. Mill references
Jesus of Nazareth as having “the complete spirit of the ethics of utility” and sees no
reason why moral sanctions couldn’t include “the hope of favour and the fear of
displeasure from our fellow creatures or from the Ruler of the Universe.”55 Mill
shows signs of supporting the notion that utilitarianism carries no moral force in a
naturalistic universe unlike Sartre who despairingly argues like a rank naturalist,
“The idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless
passion.”56 One must be careful not to assume that these statements establish Mill’s
explicit belief in God, but they do reveal that his understanding of utilitarian ethics
finds no animosity with theism.
MacIntyre, 114.
Mill, 58.
53 Mill writes, “Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily
killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young
persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and
the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in
exercise.” Ibid., 58. Mill goes on to note inferior pleasures, addiction, and the strong potential for
overall human moral decline. His warning almost sounds like a refrain of the Apostle Paul’s lament
over inherent human depravity where Paul writes, “For I do not understand my own actions. For I
do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate” (Romans 7:15, ESV).
54 Ibid., 68.
55 Ibid., 64, 74.
56 Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (Secaucus: Citadel Press, 1957), 76.
In, Hare, 118.
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2) Moral Duty to Contribute to Human Happiness
Mill strongly believed in moral duties, most specifically, one’s duty to
promote the highest pleasures for the greatest number in society. Mill’s writings
reveal his comfortability with rooting such a notion in the ethics of Jesus and the
character of God.57 When the Creator is removed from the equation, the power of
moral duties to affect the utilitarian end simply evaporates. To what realm does the
naturalist seek to teleport in order to mine moral materials? Moralizing molecules
seems to be an attempted philosophical alchemy of sorts. It is at this crossroad
where the naturalist experiences a crisis of evidential explanatory power: what to
do with information. William Dembski explains, “Communication theory’s object of
study is not particles but the information that passes between entities. Information
in turn is just another name for logos. This is an information-rich universe. The
problem with mechanistic science is that it has no resources for recognizing and
understanding information.”58 Naturalism has no such category. Due to an
unwarranted timidity, theists often opt out of holding the naturalists’ feet to the fire,
and naturalists receive a free pass on moralistic poaching. Once again the same
issue resurfaces: where do naturalists get their idea of moral duties and human
rights? A naturalist, sitting upon her moralistic high horse, pouring forth vitriol
against the alleged inhumanity of God, is inherently contradictory because she is
assuming what she is trying to disprove. As Pope Benedict XVI remarks regarding
the naturalism espoused by the New Atheists, “When you have lost God, you have
lost yourself; then you are nothing but a random product of evolution.”59 Whether on
naturalistic evolutionary survivalism or Harris’s rickety edifice of the moral
landscape, the naturalistic house of utilitarian morality sits on sinking sand.
On the other hand, Baggett and Walls argue, “The force of the moral
argument is that theism is no more outlandish or outrageous than many of our most
cherished moral convictions.”60 Not to be sidetracked with what is often
characterized as fundamentalist diatribe, it should not be dismissed a priori that
one’s moral choices affect one’s intellectual receptivity to the plausibility of God’s
existence. James Spiegel writes, “The human mind does not neutrally observe the
world, gathering facts purely and simply without any preferences or

Mill, 64, 68-69.
William Dembski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science & Theology (Downers
Grove: InterVarsity, 1999), 233.
59 Brad S. Gregory, “Science Versus Religion? The Insights and Oversights of the ‘New
Atheists,’” Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 12, no. 4 (2009): 50, accessed July 1,
2013, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/logos/summary/v012/12.4.gregory.html
60 David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 28.
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predilections.”61 These predispositions toward atheistic naturalism are, “not a loss
of intelligence so much as a selective intellectual obtuseness or imperviousness to
truths related to God, ethics, and human nature. But the root of this obtuseness is
moral in nature (emphasis mine).”62 Factors such as an absent or abusive/weak
father, according to Spiegel, have a high potential for creating a fertile ground for
atheism.63 While father issues may increase one’s proclivity toward atheism, the
most shocking data is the correlation between sexual promiscuity and atheism.64
Not only is moral duty, whether Kantian or utilitarian, bankrupt on
naturalism, but Saul Bellow expresses the permeating pointlessness of naturalism,
“But what is the philosophy of this generation? Not God is dead, that was passed
long ago. Perhaps it should be stated death as God. This generation thinks—and
this is its thought of thoughts—that nothing fateful, vulnerable, fragile can be
durable or have any true power. Death waits for these things as a cement floor

James Spiegel, The Making of an Atheist: How Immorality Leads to Unbelief (Chicago:
Moody, 2010), 13.
62 Ibid., 56.
63 Spiegel supports this claim with fascinating details of the lives of famous atheists that,
according to Spiegel, were contributing factors to their atheism, “Atheists whose fathers died: David
Hume—was two years old when his father died. Arthur Schopenhauer—was sixteen when his father
died. Friedrich Nietzsche—was four years old when his father died. Bertrand Russell—was four
years old when his father died. Jean-Paul Sartre—was fifteen months old when his father died.
Albert Camus—was one year old when his father died. Atheists with abusive or weak fathers:
Thomas Hobbes—was seven years old when his father deserted the family. Voltaire—had a bitter
relationship with his father, whose surname (Arouet) he disowned. Baron d’Holbach—was estranged
from his father and rejected his surname (Thiry). Ludwig Feuerbach—was scandalized by his
father’s public rejection of his family (to live with another woman). Samuel Butler—was physically
and emotionally brutalized by his father. Sigmund Freud—had contempt for his father as a “sexual
pervert” and as a weak man. H.G. Wells—despised his father who neglected the family. Madalyn
Murray O’Hair—intensely hated her father, probably due to child abuse. Albert Ellis—was neglected
by his father, who eventually abandoned his family.” Ibid., 65-66.
64 Spiegel provides a few cliff notes of Paul Johnson’s sordid, Intellectuals (New York: Harper
and Row, 1988). Spiegel cites, “Jean Jacques Rousseau—intensely vain and wildly irresponsible;
sired five illegitimate children and abandoned them to orphanages, which in his social context meant
almost certain early death. Percy Bysshe Shelley—a chronic swindler with a ferocious temper; also
an adulterer who, with three different women, fathered seven children whom he basically ignored,
including one he abandoned to an orphanage, where the baby died at eighteen months. Karl Marx—
fiercely anti-Semitic; egocentric, slothful, and lecherous; exploitative of friends and unfaithful to his
wife; sired an illegitimate son, whom he refused to acknowledge. Henrik Ibsen—a vain, spiteful, and
heartless man, caring only for money; an exploiter of women and contemptuous of the needy, even
among his own family. Leo Tolstoy—megalomaniacal and misogynistic; a chronic gambler and
adulterer; a seducer of women and contemptuous of his wife. Ernest Hemingway—ironically named,
given that he was a pathological liar; also a misogynistic womanizer and self-destructive alcoholic.
Bertrand Russell—misogynistic and a serial adulterer; a chronic seducer of women, especially very
young women, even in his old age. Jean-Paul Sartre—notorious for his sexual escapades with female
students, often procured by his colleague and lover Simone de Beauvoir.” Ibid., 71-72.
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waits for a dropping light bulb.”65 If naturalism is true, talk of moral duties along
with higher or lower pleasures is little more than a depressing trek beneath the
pale banners of Vanity Fair. Talk of purpose on naturalism amounts to little more
than the soma of Huxley’s Brave New World. Honest naturalists, such as Albert
Camus, are willing to push aside the hollow trinkets of feigned moral duties and ask
the tough questions, “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that
is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the
fundamental question of philosophy.”66 Moral duty presupposes purpose, something
that an intellectually honest naturalist will find difficult providing.
3) Moral Duties and Free Will
Finally we come to the colossal question of the existence of free will—an
assertion that is a pillar for virtually all post-Enlightenment moral philosophy. The
autonomy of the self is of indescribable value in regard to free will. But one must
raise the question as to where free will is located on a naturalistic value stratum.
Does naturalism actually entail determinism? It seems that could be the case. Sam
Harris’ admission, in his groundbreaking work, Free Will, states, “The illusion of
free will is itself an illusion” only later to admit, “Am I free to change my mind? Of
course not,” strips off the verbose concoctions of naturalistic free will.67 Taken
together with Mill’s utilitarian moral duties entering the fray, the result amounts to
a philosophical standoff because such an emphasis smacks of purpose and
presupposes free will.
Mill’s utilitarianism is qualitatively humanistic, having all the trappings of
an overarching design as evidenced by the inexorable drive for human happiness.
The Hedonic principle is prescriptive but, on naturalism, from whence comes the
prescriptor? Human experience seems to suggest an almost universal moral
barometer to which C.S. Lewis appropriately applies the epithet “the odious inner
radio,” contrasting false guilt with genuine contrition.68 Without some vestige of
genuine responsibility to choose the good, the bridge between one’s actions and
moral responsibility may become subject to the decay of acidic determinism. Bush
aptly notes, “Ironically in their quest to free themselves from God they have
destroyed all hope of true freedom.”69 Naturalists such as Francis Crick and Daniel
In, Sam Keen, “Death in a Posthuman Era,” in New Theology No. 5, eds. Martin E. Marty
and Dean G. Peerman (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 79. In, Millard Erickson, Christian Theology
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1999), 1075.
66 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays: An Absurd Reasoning (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 3.
67 Sam Harris, Free Will (New York: Free Press, 2012), 64, 65.
68 C.S. Lewis, The Essential C.S. Lewis, ed. Lyle Dorsett (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 531.
Accessed November 22, 2013, http://www.cslewisinstitute.org/webfm_send/884
69 Bush, 50.
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Dennett agree that, in the paraphrase of Stewart Goetz, “any kind of freedom that
we have must be a kind of freedom that is compatible with the truth of
determinism.”70 If Crick and Dennett are correct, then one’s genetic proclivity may
come precariously close to genetic determinism.71 Heroism (a hollow term if there is
no genuine ability to choose) and cowardice lose any sense of moral distinction.
Dennett posits, “Causation is so hopelessly inscrutable as to be invisible. We see the
dramatic effects leaving; we don’t see the causes entering; we are tempted by the
hypothesis that there are no causes.”72 Yet this is little more of an argument from
silence rather than a robust rebuttal.
Contrary to the dearth of naturalistic hypotheses, Baggett and Walls,
building on George Mavrodes’ “Religion and the Queerness of Morality,” assert, “So
if one is an atheist in a Russellian world, then he’s faced with a choice: Either
affirm that morality and rationality sometimes dictate different things and then
either infer that we should do the moral, irrational thing anyway, or do the rational
thing and ignore the dictates of morality.”73 If telos is a wishful myth and there is
no true freedom, objective moral duties, or genuine choice, then the line between
pain and pleasure rapidly vaporizes under the heat of a mechanistic universe.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I have provided a number of reasons to support the idea that
naturalism may find a close fit with Mill’s utilitarianism yet fails to provide a
reasonable warrant for Mill’s utilitarian principle via lack of moral explanatory
power. I have given a number of reasons to believe that utilitarianism self-destructs
on naturalism. First, I provided a working definition for both utilitarianism and
naturalism. Second, I demonstrated the incompatibility of Mill’s utilitarianism and
naturalism due to three explanatorily weak naturalistic options: 1) cultural equality
on naturalism, 2) naturalistic evolutionary survivalism, and 3) naturalism and
creaturely flourishing. Third, I explicated the inadequacy of naturalism to account
for moral duties in three particular ways: 1) the moral vacuity of higher and lower
pleasures, 2) the lack of moral explanatory power of moral duty to contribute to
human happiness, and 3) the lack of explanatory power of moral duty and free will.
For these reasons, the case is robust against using utilitarianism within naturalism.
Stewart Goetz, “The Argument From Evil,” The Blackwell Companion of Natural Theology,
eds. William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 451.
71 To sidestep the charge of genetic determinism, naturalists may attempt to argue for a
compatibilistic sense of free will and charge certain theists with philosophical doubletalk. Reformed
Christians who eschew genetic determinism but espouse supralapsarianism and Muslims who hold
to a form of theistic fatalism are open to this counterargument.
72 Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1984), 76-77. In, ibid.
73 Baggett and Walls, 172.
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As Robert Jastrow famously declared, “For the scientist who has lived by his faith
in the power of reason, the story ends like a bad dream. He has scaled the
mountains of ignorance; he is about to conquer the highest peak; as he pulls himself
over the final rock, he is greeted by a band of theologians who have been sitting
there for centuries.”74 Let the theologian gently, and in profound epistemic humility,
resist the urge to establish the mastery of her intellectual superiority. Rather, in
sincere epistemic humility, let her extend the hand of reconciliation to the skeptic
dangling from the cliff of existential despair.
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